VEIJO KAITALA
GORDON MUNRO
The Agreement, arising from the recently concluded U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, calls for the management of these transboundary resources to be undertaken through regional fisheries management organizations. This paper represents a first attempt to analyze the optimal economic management of straddling/highly migratory stocks under the to-be-established regional organizations. Dynamic game theory, commonly used in analyzing the management of ``shared'' fishery resources, is brought to bear.
An obvious question to be raised is whether the analysis applied to ``shared'' fish stocks management is sufficient for the purpose of examining the management of straddling/highly migratory fish stocks. The analysis is not sufficient for the purpose of examining the cooperative management of straddling/highly migratory fish stocks, because, in contrast to ``shared'' fish stock management, there is no guarantee that the number and nature of joint exploiters of the resource, in the aforementioned regional organization, will be constant through time. It is the existence of what is termed the ``New Member Problem'' which most clearly distinguishes the management of straddling/highly migratory fish stocks from the management of ``shared'' fish stocks. The paper discusses several approaches to addressing the ``New Member Problem.''