RÖGNVALDUR HANNESSON
Two agents control the areas in which a migrating fish stock is located. The harvesting is sequential. The stock available to Agent 1 depends on the growth of the stock, which in turn depends on the amount left after harvesting by Agent 2. The stock available to Agent 2 is the quantity left after harvesting by Agent 1. Each agent fishes down the stock in each period to an ``abandonment level'' deemed appropriate. The problem is analyzed as a noncooperative versus cooperative, repeated game with an infinite time horizon. In the noncooperative solution, both agents will harvest the stock if the unit cost of Agent 2 is not too much higher than the unit cost of Agent 1. A cooperative solution supported by a threat to revert to the noncooperative solution if deviation occurs implies greater differences in unit costs at which both agents will harvest the stock. The problem is illustrated by a simple, numerical example.